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There is a growing group of writers and others who, although their work involves 
child and youth rights, oppose them. Dimitra Hartas presents a range of their 
disparaging tactics in her book, and the following list covers some these in italics, 
with my comments. Although Hartas writes long sections on childhood and 
knowledge, this short review concentrates on the rights sections.   
  Tactic 1. Dismiss rights as modern liberal abstract ideas, irrelevant to most of the 
world. Actually there were feudal rights in Anglo-Saxon pre-1066 law, reinforced in 
the Magna Carta 1215. The aims were: to stop tyranny through specific embodied 
freedoms; to stop kings (or governments) being above the law if they murdered, raped 
and imprisoned subjects and plundered their and their children’s property; to replace 
arbitrary misrule with due legal process, the kind of basic justice, safety and freedom 
valued in every society.   
  2.  Dismiss rights as Western imperialism wrongly imposed on communitarian 
societies. This claim ignores the long history of bitter struggles for freedom, 
especially in 13th, 17th, and 19th century Britain, in colonies in every continent, in civil 
rights movements for Black people, women and other oppressed groups. ‘Community 
leaders’, while eager to exercise their own rights, often reject rights talk for others 
when it challenges their power. It could be more imperialist to claim that only 
Western people value justice.        
  3.  Dismiss rights as individualistic. Law to protect each person’s body is the 
essential safeguard against murder, rape, torture, slavery, trafficking, arbitrary 
imprisonment, or attacks whether by monarchs, states, neighbours or violent 
marauders. Children who cannot safely collect firewood in Somalia or attend school 
in Afghanistan need these legal protections. Far from individualism, human rights 
involve equal rights for everyone, whether to available health care or to a seat on a 
bus in Alabama. So human rights inhere in relationships of solidarity, responsibility 
and mutual respect between everyone. 
  4.  Paradoxically propose personal individual rights-making. This tactic claims that 
it is more ‘responsible’ when people invent their own rules and rights (Hartas, pp15-
119. Page numbers in brackets refer to Hartas and give a few from her repeated 
examples). The tactic ignores centuries of legal and political debate and struggle, 
which developed rights as agreed basic international standards. It misunderstands that 
rights are practical legal freedoms and protections that can ultimately be enforced. 
  5.  Do not read the United Nations 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC). Refer to it only through secondary and often critical sources. Then you can 
misquote it and claim that UNCRC is ‘abstract’ (p18) and not about specific rights. 
You can invent things that UNCRC does not state: children’s decision-making, or 
‘right to participate’ (p99). You can blame UNCRC for omitting matters that it does 
cover (p115). For example, several articles refer to family and community, and there 
is great emphasis on children’s diverse cultural rights (Preamble, articles 4, 17, 20, 23, 
29, 30, 31) contrary to the claims that UNCRC imposes one universal model of 
childhood.  
  6.  Blame the UNCRC when children’s rights are not honoured (pp97-102) – instead 
of seeing how UNCRC is abused or misused or confused with other authorities.   
  7.  Imply that children’s rights are disrespected because children are too weak or 
immature, instead of seeing how adults’ rights are similarly violated (pp108-9).   
  8.  Quote from a mixture of cross-referencing covertly anti-rights literature. This 
obscures children’s rights in ever denser fogs, by overlooking how each critical group 
has different ideas of ‘truth’ and morality, with different methods and motives for 
questioning the validity and value of children’s rights. For example, many adults are 
averse to sharing power with children. Many educationalists and psychologists cannot 
reconcile child development theory and the steps from ‘zero at birth’ up to adulthood, 
with equal rights for all. Early years writers often infantilise all children and young 
people (pp109, 113). Neo-liberals and many North Americans oppose the United 
Nations and its Conventions as well as children’s rights (p96). Feminists tend to see 
them as threatening women’s rights. Academics (I write as one, though accurately 
here, I hope) like to show off with nitpicking fault finding. Anthropologists tend to 
oppose anything that might transfer across cultural difference - like the UNCRC. 
Postmodernists and social constructionists are wary of things that seem too ‘real’ and 
non-relativist (p131-7). Economists prefer measurable utilities to principled rights.   
  9. Rely on jargon. Avoid giving explanations or examples to illustrate points. I have 
taken care to quote the following, from many examples, accurately:  
‘Taking a dialectical approach to rights is likely to support young people in 
actively forming their own identities and negotiating crises in their life. 
Moreover, a dialectical approach is likely to bridge seemingly contradictory 
views about the validity of knowledge as reason and knowledge and as a 
cultural artefact towards what Santos (1995) describes as a “new common 
sense” that encapsulates both logos (reason) and mythos (folklore)’(p118).  
We are not told or shown how or why dialectics, or Santos’s idea, like many other 
undigested non sequiturs through the book, are relevant.   
  10. Do not systematically research children’s rights. Hartas’s book is ‘based’ (p 
xxii) on a small needs analysis and an attitudes survey (pp181-3). Neither mentions 
rights.  
  11. Assume that ‘participation’ equals respecting children’s views and rights, and 
that it inevitably undermines their protection and provision rights – as if children are 
invariably unreliable self-harming beings. This ignores the countless times when 
adults can only really protect and provide for children though listening and being 
partners with them.   
  12. Invent meaningless new rights such as ‘to an open future’ or ‘the right to 
childhoods’.   
 
Priscilla Alderson 
Institute of Education University of London 
  
 
